The Best-Performing Stock Nobody Talks About
In 2023, the S&P 500's best performer was not Nvidia, not Meta, not Eli Lilly. It was a power company headquartered in Irving, Texas — a company most people outside the energy sector had never heard of, and one that, just seven years earlier, had emerged from the largest bankruptcy in the history of the Texas electricity market. Vistra Corp returned 123% that year. Then, in 2024, it did something arguably more improbable: it returned another 261%, making it the single best-performing stock in the S&P 500 for the second consecutive year. A company that generates electricity from natural gas, coal, nuclear reactors, and solar panels — the least glamorous corners of the American economy — became Wall Street's most rewarded bet. Not on hype. Not on a product roadmap. On megawatts.
The explanation for this performance is not a single catalyst but a convergence — the collision of artificial intelligence's insatiable demand for power, years of disciplined capital return, the repricing of reliable baseload generation in a grid stretched to its physical limits, and a management team that understood, before almost anyone else in the sector, that the energy transition would not reduce the value of dispatchable power but dramatically increase it. Vistra is the company that bet on the thesis that electrons are the new oil — and that the companies capable of producing them on demand, at scale, around the clock, would be valued not as regulated utilities but as irreplaceable infrastructure monopolies.
The numbers, even now, have a hallucinatory quality for a power generator.
By the Numbers
The Vistra Machine
$6.3BNet income (2024)
~41 GWGeneration capacity across fleet
$41B+Enterprise value (mid-2025)
$4.9BAdjusted EBITDA (2024 midpoint guidance, later raised)
~5MRetail electricity customers
261%Stock return in 2024 (S&P 500 best)
6,800 MWNuclear capacity (largest U.S. fleet after Constellation)
$3.25B+Capital returned to shareholders (2021–2024)
This is a story about what happens when a despised asset class — fossil-fuel and nuclear power generation — gets repriced by the physical realities of a civilization that suddenly needs far more electricity than it planned for. It is also a story about financial engineering, about a CEO who came from the private equity world rather than the utility world, and about a grid — specifically, the Texas grid — whose deregulated structure creates both spectacular opportunities and existential risks. The wind that fills Vistra's sails is the same wind that, in February 2021, nearly destroyed it.
Bankruptcy's Children
To understand Vistra, you must understand what it was born from, and why that origin matters. The company's predecessor, Energy Future Holdings — originally TXU Corp — was the subject of the largest leveraged buyout in history at the time of its announcement in 2007. KKR, TPG Capital, and Goldman Sachs paid $45 billion for the Texas utility, a bet predicated on the assumption that natural gas prices would remain high, making TXU's fleet of coal-fired and nuclear power plants enormously profitable on a spread basis. They were buying cheap generation into what they expected to be an expensive power market.
The thesis was precisely, catastrophically wrong. The shale revolution — horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing — unleashed a flood of cheap natural gas that collapsed power prices across ERCOT, the Texas grid. The coal plants that were supposed to print money became liabilities. The $45 billion in debt became unpayable. Energy Future Holdings filed for Chapter 11 in April 2014, the largest bankruptcy in the history of the U.S. power sector, wiping out roughly $30 billion in equity value and restructuring approximately $42 billion in debt.
What emerged from this wreckage, in October 2016, was Vistra Energy Corp — stripped of the nuclear fleet (which went to a separate entity initially), carrying a cleaner balance sheet, and run by people who had learned the most expensive possible lesson about commodity exposure, leverage, and the danger of making a one-directional bet on energy prices.
Curt Morgan became CEO in the immediate post-bankruptcy period, but the architect of Vistra's modern identity is Jim Burke, who succeeded Morgan in 2024 after serving as president and COO. Burke, a veteran of the deregulated power markets, embodies the company's operational philosophy: relentless cost discipline, aggressive capital return, and a trader's instinct for when assets are mispriced. The management team that runs Vistra today is not a team of utility lifers — they are dealmakers and operators who view power plants the way private equity views portfolio companies: as cash-flow engines to be optimized, consolidated, and, when the market misprices them, accumulated.
We are not a utility. We are a competitive power company. We eat what we kill.
The Integrated Model: Generation Meets Retail
Vistra's strategic architecture is unusual among independent power producers, and this architecture is the single most important thing to understand about the company. Most IPPs — NRG Energy, Talen Energy, the old Calpine — generate electricity and sell it into wholesale markets, exposing themselves directly to the volatility of power prices. Vistra does this too, but it also owns one of the largest retail electricity businesses in the United States: TXU Energy and Dynegy's legacy retail brands, along with the Ambit Energy acquisition.
The retail business serves roughly five million customers across Texas, the Northeast, and the Midwest, selling electricity plans directly to homes and businesses. This is not a low-margin commodity retail operation — in deregulated Texas, retail electricity is a branding business, with customer acquisition costs, churn management, and pricing optimization that look more like consumer fintech than traditional utility service.
The integration of generation and retail creates a natural hedge that is Vistra's most underappreciated structural advantage. When wholesale power prices spike — as they did catastrophically during Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, when ERCOT prices hit the $9,000/MWh cap for days — the generation fleet profits enormously on the wholesale side. But the retail business, which has sold electricity to customers at fixed rates, hemorrhages cash because it must procure power at market prices (or self-supply from its own fleet, if the plants are running). When prices are low, the dynamic reverses: generation margins compress, but the retail business collects healthy spreads because it sells at a markup to low-cost wholesale power.
In theory, this integration smooths earnings volatility. In practice, Winter Storm Uri nearly broke the model. Vistra's retail arm lost approximately $1.6 billion during the February 2021 storm, and the generation fleet's profits only partially offset the damage because several of Vistra's own plants tripped offline in the extreme cold. The company survived, but the experience was a near-death moment that reshaped its risk management, winterization investments, and hedging philosophy. It also created the political and regulatory environment that would ultimately benefit Vistra — the Texas legislature's post-Uri reforms, including the creation of a performance credit mechanism (PCM) designed to compensate generators for maintaining reliable, dispatchable capacity.
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Winter Storm Uri: The Week That Remade Texas Power
February 13–19, 2021
Feb 13Arctic blast begins moving into Texas; temperatures plunge 40°F below normal in some areas.
Feb 14–15Natural gas wellheads and pipelines freeze. 30+ GW of generation goes offline. ERCOT declares Energy Emergency Alert Level 3.
Feb 15–17Rolling blackouts hit 4.5 million Texas customers. Wholesale prices locked at $9,000/MWh cap for ~72 hours straight.
Feb 18Vistra's retail arm absorbs massive mark-to-market losses; generation fleet partially offline due to equipment freeze-offs.
Mar 2021Vistra reports ~$1.6B in net losses from Uri across its retail and generation segments.
2021–23Texas Legislature passes SB 3 mandating weatherization; PUCT develops Performance Credit Mechanism to incentivize dispatchable capacity.
The integrated model, stress-tested by the worst grid event in modern American history, emerged stronger — not because it prevented losses, but because Vistra's diversified cash-flow profile allowed it to absorb the hit without restructuring. A pure-play retailer, like Griddy, went bankrupt. A pure-play generator might have profited enormously but would have had no recurring retail cash flow in the quiet years. Vistra had both — and learned to hedge the tails more aggressively.
The Nuclear Bet
The most consequential acquisition in Vistra's history closed in March 2024, though its roots stretch back to the company's own bankruptcy-era spin-off. When Energy Future Holdings restructured, its nuclear fleet — the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, a two-unit, 2,400 MW pressurized water reactor facility in Glen Rose, Texas — remained with Vistra. But the broader nuclear fleet of Luminant (the generation subsidiary) had been viewed, in the post-Fukushima, cheap-gas era, as a liability. Nuclear plants were expensive to operate, inflexible, and competing against $2 natural gas.
Then the world changed.
The
Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 included production tax credits for existing nuclear plants — effectively a floor on nuclear economics that guaranteed profitability even in low-price environments. Simultaneously, the AI boom began driving electricity demand projections to levels not seen since the industrial buildout of the mid-20th century. Data centers, which consumed roughly 17 GW of U.S. power capacity in 2022, were projected to require 35–50 GW by 2030. Hyperscalers — Microsoft, Amazon, Google, Meta — began signing long-term power purchase agreements at premium prices for 24/7 carbon-free electricity. And the only existing technology capable of delivering carbon-free, baseload, always-on power at scale was nuclear.
Vistra moved decisively. In March 2024, the company completed its acquisition of Energy Harbor — the former FirstEnergy Solutions, itself a bankruptcy-era spinoff — for approximately $3.4 billion in cash and stock. Energy Harbor owned and operated four nuclear reactors across three plants in Ohio and Pennsylvania, totaling approximately 4,000 MW. Combined with Comanche Peak's 2,400 MW, the deal made Vistra the second-largest nuclear fleet operator in the United States, behind only Constellation Energy.
Nuclear went from being the asset class that people wanted to give away to the asset class that is arguably the most strategically valuable in the American power sector. We saw that inflection early and we acted.
The timing was exquisite. Within months of closing the Energy Harbor deal, Constellation announced a $1.6 billion agreement with Microsoft to restart the Three Mile Island Unit 1 reactor — a deal that repriced every operating nuclear megawatt in the country. Talen Energy signed a $650 million data center deal with Amazon at its Susquehanna nuclear plant. Nuclear power, an industry that had spent two decades in existential crisis, was suddenly the most sought-after asset in American energy.
Vistra's stock responded accordingly. The Energy Harbor acquisition, purchased at what now looks like a fraction of the implied per-MW valuation that subsequent nuclear transactions have established, may be one of the most value-accretive deals in the power sector's history. By late 2024, analysts estimated the nuclear fleet alone was worth more than Vistra's entire pre-acquisition enterprise value.
The ERCOT Advantage — and the ERCOT Risk
Geography is destiny in the power business, and Vistra's destiny is Texas. Approximately 60% of the company's generation capacity sits within ERCOT — the Electric Reliability Council of Texas — the only major grid in the continental United States that operates as an energy-only market, deregulated from top to bottom, with no capacity payments, no federal oversight from FERC, and prices set purely by supply and demand.
This structure is Vistra's great amplifier. In ERCOT, when demand surges and supply tightens — a brutally hot August afternoon, a polar vortex, a confluence of wind lulls and plant outages — prices do not gradually rise. They spike. The market clearing price can move from $30/MWh to $5,000/MWh in fifteen minutes. For a company that owns 18+ GW of dispatchable generation in ERCOT and has retail contracts to supply, these price spikes are the moments when an entire year's economics can be made or broken in a week.
The flipside is symmetrical. ERCOT's energy-only design means generators receive no capacity payments simply for existing — unlike PJM or ISO-NE, where generators are compensated for being available regardless of whether they run. In ERCOT, if your plant doesn't run, you earn nothing. If the market is oversupplied and prices stay low for months, your fixed costs eat you alive. If an extreme weather event knocks your plants offline while prices are at the cap, you lose on both sides: no generation revenue and massive retail obligations.
This is why Vistra's post-Uri push for the Performance Credit Mechanism matters. The PCM, still being refined by the Public
Utility Commission of Texas, would introduce a form of capacity compensation for dispatchable generators — essentially paying plants for being reliable during critical periods. If implemented in a form favorable to large dispatchable fleet owners, it would structurally de-risk Vistra's ERCOT position by adding a predictable revenue stream on top of volatile energy margins.
But ERCOT's deregulated structure also means Vistra faces competitive dynamics that its PJM and ISO-NE peers do not. New generation — particularly subsidized renewables — can enter the market without the capacity auction gatekeeping that exists in other ISOs. Wind and solar have driven down average energy prices in ERCOT even as peak prices have increased in volatility, creating a dumbbell-shaped price distribution: lots of very cheap hours, a few extremely expensive hours, and little in between. Navigating this distribution is a trading and hedging problem as much as a generation problem, and Vistra's commercial team is arguably its most important competitive asset.
Capital Return as Strategy, Not Afterthought
The most revealing number in Vistra's financial history is not its generation capacity or its revenue — it is the amount of capital it has returned to shareholders relative to its market capitalization over time. Between 2021 and 2024, Vistra returned more than $3.25 billion to shareholders through share repurchases and dividends, a figure that, at the beginning of that period, represented a significant fraction of the company's entire equity value.
This was not a "returning excess cash" story. It was strategy. Vistra's management team, shaped by private equity and distressed-asset sensibilities, viewed their own stock as the highest-returning investment available. When the market valued Vistra at 4–5x EBITDA — a discount typical of thermal generators in an era when ESG-driven capital was fleeing the sector — management bought back shares with a conviction that bordered on aggression. The company retired roughly 30% of its outstanding shares over a four-year period.
The math of buybacks at depressed valuations, followed by a multi-hundred-percent stock rerating, is the kind of compounding that turns a $20 stock into a $170 stock. It is also the mechanism by which Vistra's early shareholders — those who understood the business through the Uri crisis and the ESG discount — earned returns that rival early-stage venture investments. Buying back stock at $20 when the intrinsic value is $50, and then watching the market reprice to $170, creates a triple compounding effect: earnings growth, multiple expansion, and share count reduction all working simultaneously.
We have retired almost a third of our shares outstanding since 2021. We did it because the market was giving us an absurd discount for owning assets that this country cannot function without. We bought our own optionality.
The dividend, while modest in yield terms (roughly 1% at current prices), provides a floor of capital return discipline. But the buyback is the main event — and it signals something important about management's mental model. They view Vistra not as an income stock for retirees but as a free cash flow compounder whose equity is systematically undervalued by a market that cannot properly categorize a nuclear-gas-coal-solar-retail integrated power company.
The Demand Shock That Changed Everything
For most of the past fifteen years, electricity demand in the United States was essentially flat. The efficiency gains from LED lighting, better appliances, and industrial offshoring roughly offset population growth and electrification. Utility analysts modeled 0–1% annual load growth and built their DCFs accordingly. Power generation was, in the consensus view, a declining or stagnant industry.
Then came the data centers. Then came AI.
The numbers are staggering and still growing. In January 2024, PJM — the grid operator covering 13 states from Illinois to Virginia — revised its 15-year load growth forecast upward by 40%, driven almost entirely by data center interconnection requests. ERCOT's long-term demand forecasts have been revised upward repeatedly, with some scenarios showing peak demand growing from ~85 GW today to over 150 GW by 2030. Goldman Sachs estimated in mid-2024 that U.S. power demand would grow by 2.4% annually through 2030 — a rate not seen since the early 2000s — with data centers accounting for the majority of incremental demand.
This demand shock is uniquely favorable to Vistra's portfolio for three reasons. First, data centers require reliable, dispatchable, 24/7 power — characteristics that match nuclear and natural gas generation perfectly, and that intermittent renewables cannot provide without massive (and not yet economically deployed) battery storage. Second, the demand is concentrated in the geographies where Vistra operates — Texas (which has attracted more data center investment than any other state) and PJM (which covers the "data center alley" corridor of Northern Virginia, the densest concentration of data centers on Earth). Third, the demand is growing faster than new supply can be built. Permitting a new natural gas plant takes 3–5 years. Building a new nuclear plant takes a decade or more. The existing fleet of dispatchable generation has become, effectively, a scarce resource — and Vistra owns more of it than almost anyone.
The market began repricing this scarcity in late 2023 and accelerated through 2024. Forward power prices in ERCOT and PJM moved sharply higher. Nuclear plants, which had been valued at $400–600/kW, began trading at implied valuations of $1,500–2,500/kW based on comparable transactions. And Vistra, which owned both the generation fleet and the retail platform to monetize higher prices, saw its stock become the purest expression of the "power is the new oil" thesis available in public markets.
The Fleet: A Portfolio Theory of Power Generation
Vistra's generation fleet is a deliberate portfolio, not an accident of history — though history certainly shaped it. As of early 2025, the company operates approximately 41 GW of generation capacity across multiple fuel types, making it one of the largest power generators in the United States.
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Vistra's Generation Fleet
Approximate capacity by fuel type (2025)
| Fuel Type | Capacity (GW) | % of Fleet | Role |
|---|
| Natural Gas | ~24 | ~59% | Dispatchable baseload and peaking |
| Nuclear | ~6.4 | ~16% | 24/7 carbon-free baseload |
| Coal | ~4.6 | ~11% | Dispatchable baseload (retiring) |
| Solar | ~1.2 | ~3% | Intermittent daytime generation |
| Battery Storage |
The natural gas fleet is the workhorse — highly efficient combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) that can run as baseload when prices support it, and peaking units that sit idle for months and then earn their entire annual economics in a single heat wave. The nuclear fleet, post–Energy Harbor, is the crown jewel — zero-carbon, always-on generation that commands premium pricing in a world desperate for clean electrons. The coal fleet, concentrated in Illinois and Texas, is being systematically retired as economics dictate, though the plants have experienced a partial reprieve as tight markets have made even high-cost coal generation profitable during peak periods.
The solar and battery storage portfolio, while small relative to the thermal fleet, represents Vistra's hedge against a future where renewables-plus-storage become the dominant marginal supply source. The company has developed the 400+ MW Moss Landing battery storage facility in California and has solar projects in ERCOT, positioning it to capture renewable energy subsidies while maintaining its core dispatchable franchise.
This diversity is not accidental. It is a portfolio designed to make money in every plausible future state of the world. If gas prices spike, the nuclear plants and contracted gas fleet benefit from high power prices while fuel costs are locked in or irrelevant. If gas prices crash, the gas fleet's low marginal cost allows it to run profitably while competitors shut down. If carbon pricing arrives, the nuclear fleet becomes exponentially more valuable. If renewables flood the market and collapse average prices, the peaking gas fleet earns scarcity rents during the hours when renewables can't produce. The only scenario that is truly hostile to Vistra is prolonged energy price deflation across all hours — a scenario that the AI-driven demand shock has made dramatically less likely.
The Retail Machine
Vistra's retail electricity business, operated primarily under the TXU Energy brand in Texas and Dynegy and Ambit brands elsewhere, is not a sleepy utility operation. It is a consumer acquisition and retention machine that looks more like a subscription business than a regulated service.
In deregulated Texas, consumers choose their electricity provider the way they choose a cell phone plan — selecting from dozens of competing retailers offering different rate structures, contract lengths, and value-added services. TXU Energy is the largest retail electricity provider in Texas, a position it has maintained through brand recognition, aggressive marketing, and a product lineup that ranges from basic fixed-rate plans to green energy options, prepaid electricity, and demand-response programs.
The economics are revealing. Retail electricity customers, once acquired, generate recurring revenue with relatively predictable usage patterns. Customer acquisition costs are meaningful — Vistra spends heavily on marketing, door-to-door sales, and digital acquisition — but the lifetime value of a retained customer, paying a markup over wholesale electricity costs, generates steady free cash flow that is largely uncorrelated with the volatility of wholesale markets. The retail business also provides Vistra with a built-in demand sink for its generation fleet, reducing the company's exposure to wholesale market dynamics and providing a natural internal hedge.
The retail business contributed approximately $1.5–2.0 billion in adjusted EBITDA in 2024, representing roughly a third of the company's consolidated earnings. It is the stable base on which the more volatile generation earnings sit — the annuity that allows Vistra to take risk on the commodity side without existential exposure.
The People Who Built the Machine
Vistra's management team is distinctive in a sector dominated by engineer-operators and regulated-utility bureaucrats. The company's culture was forged in bankruptcy and shaped by private equity sensibilities — a culture that views every dollar of capital as having an opportunity cost, every asset as having a replacement value, and every strategic decision through the lens of risk-adjusted returns rather than empire-building.
Curt Morgan, who served as CEO from 2016 through early 2024, was the post-bankruptcy architect. A former executive at NRG Energy and Dynegy, Morgan brought a dealmaker's mentality to a company that needed to be rebuilt from scratch. He oversaw the integration of the Dynegy acquisition (2018), the development of the retail platform, and the aggressive share repurchase program that would prove to be one of the most value-creating capital allocation decisions in the power sector's recent history. Morgan was blunt, operationally focused, and allergic to the kind of grandiose "energy transition" rhetoric that characterized many of Vistra's peers.
Jim Burke, who became CEO in early 2024, represents continuity with intensification. A career power-market executive who had been Morgan's operational right hand, Burke inherited a company in the early stages of a massive rerating and immediately accelerated the nuclear strategy through the Energy Harbor integration. Burke's public communications are notable for their precision — he speaks in megawatts, heat rates, and EBITDA margins rather than aspirational narratives. He has signaled that Vistra will remain acquisitive where nuclear and gas assets can be purchased below replacement cost, and has been explicit that the company's capital allocation framework prioritizes buybacks, debt reduction, and accretive M&A over speculative growth investments.
The bench below Burke matters too. Vistra's commercial operations team — the traders and originators who manage the company's hedging book, wholesale market positioning, and retail pricing — are regarded within the industry as among the best in the business. In a company where a single week of weather can determine an entire year's profitability, the quality of real-time commercial decision-making is not a support function. It is the core competency.
The Coal Problem and the Transition Paradox
Vistra still operates coal-fired power plants. This fact — roughly 4.6 GW of coal capacity, concentrated in Illinois and Texas — represents both a real operational reality and a narrative liability that has dogged the company's valuation for years.
The coal plants are being retired on an accelerating timeline. Vistra has announced plans to close its remaining coal units by 2027–2030, depending on market conditions and grid reliability needs. The company has already retired several coal units in Texas and Illinois, and the remaining fleet operates primarily as a capacity reserve — running during periods of extreme demand when all available generation is needed, and sitting idle during normal conditions.
But the transition paradox is this: the same grid reliability crisis that has made Vistra's gas and nuclear plants so valuable has also extended the economic life of its coal plants. When ERCOT or PJM faces a capacity shortfall during extreme weather, every megawatt matters — including coal megawatts. The Texas grid operator has, on multiple occasions, asked generators to delay planned coal retirements because replacement capacity has not been built quickly enough. Vistra has complied, maintaining coal plants in operational reserve at a cost that is partially offset by the high prices they earn during scarcity events.
The ESG implications are complex. Vistra has committed to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and has published detailed decarbonization plans. Its nuclear fleet — which produces zero carbon emissions — is now its largest non-gas generation source. But the coal plants remain, and they make Vistra uninvestable for a significant portion of the institutional capital market that applies carbon screens. This ESG discount, paradoxically, contributed to the undervaluation that made Vistra's share buybacks so spectacularly accretive. The very institutions that refused to own Vistra because of its coal fleet created the buying opportunity for those who could see past the label to the cash flows.
We will retire coal when the grid allows it and economics dictate it. We will not retire coal to satisfy a narrative while the lights go out. That is not a responsible energy transition — that is performance art.
The Data Center Gold Rush
By mid-2025, Vistra's strategic positioning for the data center buildout has moved from thesis to execution. The company has engaged in discussions and agreements with hyperscale data center operators seeking long-term power supply arrangements, particularly at or near its nuclear facilities and large gas-fired plants.
The opportunity is enormous. A single hyperscale data center campus can consume 500 MW to 2 GW of continuous power — the equivalent of powering a small city. These facilities require 99.999% uptime and are willing to pay premium prices for guaranteed, long-term power supply. For a nuclear plant operator, a 15–20 year power purchase agreement with a creditworthy counterparty like Microsoft or Amazon at above-market prices is the equivalent of finding a gold mine under an existing asset.
Vistra has been characteristically disciplined about how it approaches this opportunity. Rather than rushing to sign co-location deals that might compromise grid reliability or trigger regulatory backlash — as Talen Energy's Susquehanna deal drew scrutiny from PJM and FERC — Vistra has pursued a portfolio approach: bilateral PPAs from existing plants, behind-the-meter arrangements where feasible, and a willingness to build new gas-fired capacity specifically to serve data center loads.
The company's ERCOT position is particularly advantageous for data center supply. Texas has no state income tax, abundant land, favorable permitting, and a deregulated power market that allows generators and consumers to contract directly. Several of the largest data center developments in the country are planned or under construction in Texas, and Vistra's fleet provides the dispatchable backbone that these facilities require.
An Image That Resolves
On the western edge of Somervell County, Texas, where the Brazos River cuts through limestone bluffs sixty miles southwest of Fort Worth, the twin containment domes of Comanche Peak rise from the landscape like concrete cathedrals. The plant, built in the 1990s at a cost of $11 billion — a sum that nearly bankrupted its original owner, TXU — was considered a white elephant for most of its existence. Too expensive. Too inflexible. Too nuclear.
In 2024, Comanche Peak generated approximately 19 million megawatt-hours of carbon-free electricity, running at a capacity factor above 90%. At current forward power prices in ERCOT, that output is worth roughly $1.5 billion per year in revenue. The plant employs over 1,200 people in a county of 9,000. Its operating license runs through the 2030s, with extension applications that could carry it to mid-century.
The most expensive mistake in the history of Texas electricity — the plant that helped bankrupt its owners, that was written off as a relic of a failed nuclear era — is now, by virtually any measure, the single most valuable power-generating asset in the state. The market has repriced it. Vistra owns it. The containment domes, visible for miles across the Texas prairie, cast long shadows in the late afternoon light. They are generating electricity right now.
