Clayton Christensen called it the Law of Conservation of Attractive Profits: when one layer in a value chain becomes modular and commoditised, the adjacent layer becomes integral and profitable. The profits don't disappear. They migrate. The strategic question — the only one that matters — is whether you are building in the modular layer or the integral layer, because the economics of each are diametrically opposed and the wrong choice is terminal.
The PC industry provides the canonical demonstration. In the 1980s, IBM owned the entire personal computer stack: hardware design, operating system, application software, distribution. The value chain was vertically integrated, and IBM captured value at every layer. Then IBM modularised the hardware architecture — open standards, interchangeable components, commodity manufacturing. The hardware layer became modular: any manufacturer could assemble a PC from standardised parts. The profits didn't vanish. They migrated to the layers that remained integral: Microsoft's operating system (the software layer that tied the modular hardware together) and Intel's processors (the component that determined performance across all modular hardware configurations). "Wintel" captured the value that IBM's modularisation released. IBM's PC division, which had created the market, was eventually sold to Lenovo for $1.75 billion — a rounding error compared to Microsoft's and Intel's cumulative profits.
Apple understood Christensen's law and made the opposite choice. While the PC industry modularised, Apple kept its value chain integrated — designing the hardware, the operating system, the silicon, and the retail experience as a single interdependent system. The integration captured value because each layer was optimised for the others in ways that modular competitors couldn't match. The M1 chip was designed specifically for macOS. macOS was designed specifically for Apple hardware. The retail experience was designed specifically to demonstrate the integrated product. The result: Apple captured 80%+ of the smartphone industry's profits with roughly 20% of its unit share. Integration in a modular world is the highest-margin position available.
AWS provides the most consequential modern example. Amazon modularised computing infrastructure — servers, storage, networking, databases — into standardised, interchangeable services available via API. Before AWS, every company that needed computing infrastructure had to build its own integral stack: buy servers, hire operations teams, manage data centres. AWS modularised that stack into commoditised components. The infrastructure layer became modular. Christensen's law predicted what happened next: profits migrated to the adjacent integral layer — the application layer. Companies like Stripe, Snowflake, Datadog, and Twilio built integral products on top of AWS's modular infrastructure, capturing value because their software integrated data, workflows, and user experiences in ways that modular infrastructure alone could not.
The pattern repeats across every industry. Smartphone hardware is increasingly modular — Qualcomm's chips, Samsung's displays, and Foxconn's assembly are available to every manufacturer. The integral layer is the software ecosystem: Apple's iOS and Google's Android capture value because they integrate the modular hardware into a coherent user experience. Semiconductor fabrication was modular until TSMC made leading-edge manufacturing integral — and now TSMC captures value that the entire fabless semiconductor industry depends on. Media distribution modularised (anyone can publish content to the internet), and the aggregation layer became integral — Google, Facebook, and YouTube capture the value because they integrate modular content into a coherent discovery experience.
The law is not a theory. It is a description of how value moves through technology stacks, and it has predicted the winner in every major platform shift of the past forty years. The leaders who understand it position their companies at the integral layer before the modularisation of the adjacent layer becomes obvious. The leaders who miss it build better commodities — and watch their margins evaporate as substitutes proliferate.
Section 2
How to See It
Modularity reveals itself through the commoditisation signal — the moment when components that were once differentiated become interchangeable and price-driven. When you can swap one supplier for another without meaningful performance difference, that layer has become modular. The diagnostic question: does the customer care which specific component is in this layer, or do they care only about what the integrated system above it delivers?
The second signal is profit migration. When an industry's margins shift from one layer of the value chain to another — when the hardware company's margins compress while the software company's margins expand, or when the infrastructure provider's margins shrink while the application provider's margins grow — you are watching Christensen's law in real time.
You're seeing Modularity when the value chain disaggregates into interchangeable layers, profits migrate from the modularised layer to the adjacent integral layer, and the company that controls the integral layer captures disproportionate value.
Technology
You're seeing Modularity when Android smartphone manufacturers compete on price while Google captures the majority of mobile advertising revenue. The hardware layer — screens, processors, cameras, batteries — is modular. Any manufacturer can assemble a competitive smartphone from commodity components. The integral layer is Android's operating system and Google's services ecosystem (Search, Maps, Gmail, Play Store), which tie the modular hardware into a coherent experience and capture user data that powers Google's advertising business. Samsung, Xiaomi, and Oppo fight over thin hardware margins. Google captures the value from the integral software layer above.
Cloud & Infrastructure
You're seeing Modularity when AWS, Azure, and GCP engage in relentless price competition on compute and storage — dropping prices dozens of times per year — while application-layer companies like Snowflake command 70%+ gross margins. The infrastructure layer has become modular: a virtual machine on AWS is functionally interchangeable with one on Azure. The integral layer — the application that organises, analyses, or transforms the data sitting on that modular infrastructure — captures the value, because the application integrates modular components into a workflow the customer cannot replicate by assembling the components themselves.
Financial Services
You're seeing Modularity when payment processing becomes a modular API (Stripe, Adyen, Braintree are increasingly interchangeable on core processing) and the integral layer shifts to the financial products built on top — lending, treasury management, fraud detection, embedded finance. The processing layer commoditises. The orchestration and intelligence layer, which integrates payment data with business logic in ways that raw processing cannot, captures the margin. Stripe's strategic expansion from payments into Stripe Capital, Stripe Treasury, and Stripe Radar reflects an understanding that the processing layer it pioneered is modularising, and the value is migrating upward.
Investing
You're seeing Modularity when an investor evaluates a company and asks: is this business operating in the modular layer or the integral layer? Companies in the modular layer face relentless price competition, margin compression, and substitution risk. Companies in the integral layer enjoy pricing power, customer lock-in, and expanding margins. The same revenue can mean entirely different things depending on which layer it comes from. A dollar of revenue from a modular layer is worth less than a dollar from an integral layer because the modular dollar is vulnerable to commoditisation while the integral dollar is protected by the complexity of the integration it provides.
Section 3
How to Use It
Modularity is the single most reliable framework for predicting where profits will accumulate in a value chain. The strategic imperative is to position your company in the integral layer — the layer that ties modular components together in ways that create value no individual component can provide. If you are in the modular layer, you face a future of margin compression and substitution. If you are in the integral layer, you capture the value that modularisation releases.
Decision filter
"Before making any build-vs-buy or integration-vs-specialisation decision, ask: am I building in the layer that is modularising or the layer that is becoming integral? If modularising, you are building a commodity. If integral, you are building a moat. The distinction determines whether your margins expand or compress over the next decade."
As a founder
Map your value chain and identify which layers are modularising. Then build in the adjacent integral layer. This is the single most profitable strategic positioning available to a startup. Stripe recognised that payment processing was modularising — the underlying rails (card networks, bank connections, settlement) were becoming standardised. Stripe built in the integral layer above: a unified API that integrated those modular payment rails into a developer-friendly experience, then expanded into the financial services that sit on top of payment data. Every layer of Stripe's expansion has targeted the integral position adjacent to a modularising layer.
The trap for founders: building in a layer that feels integral today but is modularising underneath you. Cloud infrastructure felt integral in 2008. By 2015, it was modularising — AWS, Azure, and GCP competed on price and features, and infrastructure became a commodity input. The founders who built application-layer companies on top of modular cloud infrastructure (Snowflake, Datadog, Figma) captured the value. The founders who built infrastructure companies that competed directly with AWS discovered they were in the modular layer and were priced accordingly.
As an investor
Christensen's Law of Conservation of Attractive Profits is the most reliable predictor of value migration in technology investing. When you see a layer commoditising — prices dropping, competitors converging on feature parity, switching costs declining — look to the adjacent layer for the company that will capture the released value. The integral layer adjacent to a modularising one is where the next great business will be built.
The valuation framework follows directly: companies in integral layers deserve premium multiples because their competitive position is structural. Companies in modular layers deserve commodity multiples because their position is fungible. When the market assigns a premium multiple to a company in a modular layer, it is mispricing the structural economics — and the correction, when it comes, is severe. When the market assigns a commodity multiple to a company in an integral layer (often because the company is early and the integration value is not yet visible in revenue), the opportunity is significant.
As a decision-maker
The most consequential strategic decision in any technology company is whether to modularise or integrate — and the answer depends on where you sit in the value chain. If you control the integral layer, modularising the layers around you increases your value: Apple benefits from modular component suppliers because it captures the integration premium. If you are in a modularising layer, integrating vertically into the adjacent layer is the escape route: Stripe's expansion from modular payments into integral financial services is the canonical move.
The risk: modularising your own layer without controlling the adjacent integral layer. IBM modularised the PC hardware stack and lost to Microsoft and Intel, who controlled the integral software and processor layers respectively. A company that opens its architecture to standardisation must ensure it retains control of the integration point — otherwise, it has donated its margins to whoever captures the integral position.
Common misapplication: Assuming that the modular layer is always low-value. Sometimes the modular layer is the platform — and platforms can capture enormous value through volume, even at thin margins. AWS operates in what has become a modular infrastructure layer, but its scale ($90B+ revenue) and operational efficiency generate substantial absolute profits despite margin pressure. The question is not whether the layer is modular but whether you can achieve the scale required to generate returns from a commoditising position.
Second misapplication: Treating modularity as permanent. Layers that are modular today can become integral tomorrow if a player achieves sufficient technological differentiation. TSMC turned semiconductor fabrication — previously a modular commodity — into an integral layer by pushing manufacturing capability so far ahead of competitors that its process technology became irreplaceable. NVIDIA turned GPU hardware — a commodity graphics component — into an integral platform through CUDA's software ecosystem. Modularity is a state, not a sentence. The companies that generate generational returns are the ones that see a modular layer re-integrating and position themselves at the centre of the new integral position before competitors recognise the shift.
Section 4
The Mechanism
Section 5
Founders & Leaders in Action
The two leaders below made opposite architectural choices — one integrated when the industry modularised, the other modularised the layer below to capture value at the layer above — and both generated extraordinary returns because they understood which layer would capture value and positioned their companies accordingly.
What connects them is strategic clarity about Christensen's law: they didn't just build great products. They deliberately chose the layer of the value chain where profits would accumulate and structured their entire companies to exploit that position. One chose integration when the world modularised. The other built the integral layer that an entire industry would depend on. Both read the architecture correctly — and reaped the profits that Christensen's law predicted would flow to their layer.
Jobs understood modularity's implications better than any technology leader of his era — and chose the opposite strategy. While the PC industry modularised (commodity hardware, standardised interfaces, interchangeable components), Jobs kept Apple's value chain radically integrated. Apple designed its own silicon, its own operating system, its own applications, its own retail experience, and — with the iPhone — its own cellular baseband negotiation with carriers. Every layer was optimised for the layers above and below it. The M1 chip was not a general-purpose processor. It was designed specifically for macOS and the applications Apple's developers would build. The result was performance and efficiency that no modular competitor could match, because modular competitors optimised each component in isolation while Apple optimised the system as a whole. Jobs's strategic insight was that when an industry modularises, the company that maintains integration captures the premium — because it is the only company delivering the integrated experience that modular architectures cannot produce. Apple's 80%+ share of smartphone industry profits, generated from roughly 20% unit share, is the financial proof: integration in a modular world is the highest-margin position in technology.
Huang positioned NVIDIA at the integral layer of the AI computing stack through a twenty-year strategy that most observers didn't recognise until the value had already accumulated. The hardware layer of computing was modularising — CPUs were commoditising, server hardware was standardised, cloud infrastructure was becoming interchangeable. Huang's insight was that GPU-accelerated computing would become the integral layer for the emerging workloads that mattered most: AI training, scientific simulation, autonomous driving, graphics rendering. NVIDIA didn't just build better GPUs. It built CUDA — the software platform that made NVIDIA's hardware the only viable option for parallel computing workloads. CUDA created switching costs in what would otherwise have been a modular hardware layer. A researcher who writes CUDA code cannot easily port that code to AMD or Intel hardware. The software layer locked in the hardware layer, and the hardware-software integration made NVIDIA's position integral rather than modular. When AI training demand exploded after 2020, NVIDIA was the only company positioned at the integral layer of the most valuable computing workload in the world. Revenue grew from $16.7B in fiscal 2022 to $130B in fiscal 2025. Huang didn't predict AI's timeline. He positioned NVIDIA at the integral layer of any workload that required massive parallelism — and waited for the workloads to arrive.
Section 6
Visual Explanation
The diagram contrasts an integrated value chain (left) — where one company controls all layers and captures value across them — with a modularised value chain (right) — where commoditised layers lose pricing power and the integral layer captures the released profits. The three examples at bottom trace the pattern across major industry shifts: PC hardware modularised and Microsoft/Intel won the integral layers; cloud infrastructure modularised and application-layer companies captured the value; smartphone hardware modularised and Apple's integration captured the premium. The strategic question the diagram poses is binary: are you in the gold-highlighted integral layer, or the grey modular layer? The colour tells you where the profits go.
Section 7
Connected Models
Modularity sits at the centre of competitive strategy in technology and industrial markets, connecting the dynamics of how value chains disaggregate to the strategies companies use to capture value within them. The six connections below map the forces that drive modularisation, the strategies that exploit it, and the tensions that arise when companies must decide whether to modularise, integrate, or position themselves at the boundary between the two.
Reinforces
Commoditization
Commoditisation is the economic force that drives modularisation. When products in a layer become interchangeable — when customers can substitute one supplier for another without meaningful performance difference — the layer has commoditised, and modularisation follows. The reinforcement is direct: commoditisation makes components interchangeable, which enables modular architectures, which accelerates further commoditisation by increasing the number of suppliers competing on price. PC hardware commoditised because open standards made components interchangeable. Cloud infrastructure is commoditising because AWS, Azure, and GCP offer functionally equivalent services. In each case, commoditisation is the cause and modularisation is the structural consequence.
Reinforces
Unbundling
Unbundling is modularisation applied to business models rather than technology architectures. When a vertically integrated company is disaggregated into specialised providers — each serving one function of what was previously a bundled offering — the bundle has been modularised. Newspapers were unbundled into Craigslist (classifieds), ESPN.com (sports), Weather.com (weather), and Google News (headlines). Each function became a modular component served by a specialist. The unbundling released value from the integrated bundle and redistributed it to the layer that remained most integral — in this case, the audience aggregation and advertising platforms (Facebook, Google) that tied the modular content together.
Reinforces
Platform
Platforms are the architectural expression of modularity. A platform defines the standardised interfaces through which modular components interact, enabling third-party innovation on top of a stable base layer. AWS is a platform: it provides standardised APIs (interfaces) through which thousands of application companies (modular components) build products. Apple's iOS is a platform: it provides standardised frameworks through which millions of apps deliver functionality. The reinforcement: platforms accelerate modularisation by making it easy for independent developers to create interchangeable components, which deepens the modularity of the layers above the platform and reinforces the platform's position as the integral layer below.
Section 8
One Key Quote
"When the functionality of a product is not yet good enough, the companies that will be the most profitable are those that are integrated. But when functionality becomes more than adequate, the most profitable companies will be those that are modular and flexible."
— Clayton Christensen, The Innovator's Solution (2003)
The quote captures the dynamic nature of modularity — it is not a permanent state but a phase in an industry's evolution, and the optimal strategy flips as the industry moves from "not good enough" to "more than adequate." In the early smartphone era (2007–2012), functionality was not good enough — performance, battery life, and software quality all mattered intensely. Apple's integrated approach won because tight coupling between hardware and software delivered the performance improvements customers demanded. As smartphone hardware became "more than adequate" for most users (2016+), the modular Android ecosystem gained ground in unit share because the hardware layer commoditised and customers prioritised price, variety, and customisation over performance differentiation.
The strategic implication is temporal: the right architectural choice depends on where the industry is in its maturity curve. Early-stage industries reward integration because customers need performance that only tight coupling can deliver. Mature industries reward modularity because customers need flexibility, price competition, and composability that only decoupled architectures provide. The leaders who generate outsized returns are the ones who recognise the transition point — the moment when "not good enough" becomes "more than adequate" — and restructure their architecture accordingly.
Jobs recognised that smartphones were in the "not good enough" phase and chose integration. Bezos recognised that computing infrastructure was in the "more than adequate" phase and chose modularisation. Both were right, because both read the maturity curve correctly. The most expensive strategic error is misreading the curve — integrating when the industry is ready for modularity (spending engineering dollars on differentiation customers no longer value) or modularising when the industry still needs integration (surrendering the performance advantage that customers are willing to pay for). The maturity curve determines the architecture. The architecture determines the profits.
Section 9
Analyst's Take
Faster Than Normal — Editorial View
Christensen's Law of Conservation of Attractive Profits is the most reliable framework I use for predicting value migration in technology. It has correctly predicted the winner in every major platform shift I've analysed: PC hardware modularised and Microsoft/Intel captured value; cloud infrastructure modularised and the application layer captured value; smartphone hardware modularised and Apple's integration captured the premium; AI training infrastructure is consolidating into an integral layer and NVIDIA is capturing the value. The pattern is so consistent that when I evaluate a new industry, my first question is always: which layer is modularising and which layer is becoming integral? The answer tells me where to invest and where to avoid.
The pattern I track most closely: companies that deliberately modularise the layer below them to capture value at their own layer. AWS modularised computing infrastructure — and every company that builds on AWS reinforces Amazon's position while commoditising its own infrastructure dependency. Shopify modularised e-commerce infrastructure — and every merchant that builds on Shopify reinforces the platform while commoditising the previously integral functions (payments, inventory, shipping) that the merchant used to manage independently. The companies that generate the most durable returns are those that make the layer below them modular (and therefore cheap) while making their own layer integral (and therefore valuable). It is the most powerful strategic play in technology.
The most dangerous position: being in a layer that is modularising and not recognising it. The companies that get destroyed by modularity are not the ones that lack talent or resources. They are the ones that invested in differentiating a layer that was becoming commoditised. Building a better commodity is the most expensive way to lose money. Dell built the best commodity PC hardware for two decades and watched its margins compress relentlessly as the hardware layer modularised around it. The strategic response when your layer modularises is not to fight the modularisation. It is to move to the integral layer — either by integrating vertically (as Apple did) or by building the abstraction layer above the modular components (as Stripe did with payments).
The AI-era application is the most consequential of our generation. AI infrastructure is following the modularity pattern with stunning speed. Foundation models are commoditising — GPT-4, Claude, Gemini, and Llama offer increasingly comparable capabilities. The model layer is modularising. Christensen's law predicts that value will migrate to the integral layers: the application layer (companies that integrate AI models into specific workflows customers cannot replicate) and the silicon layer (NVIDIA's integral position in training hardware). The founders building AI wrappers around commodity models are building in the modular layer. The founders building integrated applications that use AI as one component of a complex, non-replicable workflow are building in the integral layer. The distinction will determine which AI companies are worth $100B and which are worth nothing.
Section 10
Test Yourself
The scenarios below test whether you can identify which layer of a value chain is modularising, which layer is becoming integral, and where profits will migrate as the architecture evolves. The diagnostic framework is Christensen's law: profits migrate from modular layers to integral layers. The analytical challenge is identifying which layer is which before the financial statements make it obvious.
Is modularity the primary force shaping this outcome?
Scenario 1
A startup builds a data analytics platform on top of AWS, using open-source tools for data ingestion, transformation, and storage. The platform's value lies in its proprietary workflow engine that orchestrates these modular components into automated data pipelines that non-technical users can build without code. Within three years, the startup achieves $100M ARR with 82% gross margins, while the underlying open-source tools it orchestrates are free.
Scenario 2
Three cloud providers — AWS, Azure, and GCP — compete on virtual machine pricing, each cutting prices 5–10% per year for a decade. A fourth provider enters with proprietary hardware that offers 30% better price-performance. After five years of aggressive marketing and $2B in investment, the fourth provider holds 2% market share. AWS, Azure, and GCP retain 65%, 22%, and 11% respectively.
Scenario 3
A smartphone manufacturer with 8% global market share earns 85% of the industry's profits. Competitors with 92% combined market share split the remaining 15% of profits. The high-profit manufacturer designs its own processor, writes its own operating system, and operates its own retail stores. Competitors use the same third-party processor, the same third-party operating system, and sell through the same carrier and retail channels.
Section 11
Top Resources
The modularity literature spans innovation economics, technology strategy, and systems architecture. Start with Christensen for the strategic framework that predicts profit migration, extend to Baldwin and Clark for the architectural theory that explains why modular systems evolve the way they do, and ground the concept in the case studies and essays that show how modularity dynamics have shaped the most consequential platform shifts in technology history. The reading order follows the concept from strategic prediction to structural explanation to modern application.
The most important takeaway from the literature: modularity is not a choice companies make. It is a force that acts on industries — and the companies that recognise which layer the force is modularising, and position themselves in the adjacent integral layer, capture the value that the force releases.
The definitive strategic treatment of modularity. Christensen and Raynor introduce the Law of Conservation of Attractive Profits and demonstrate how profits migrate between modular and integral layers as industries mature. The book's framework for predicting when integration wins (product not good enough) versus when modularity wins (product more than adequate) is the most actionable tool for technology strategists evaluating architectural decisions. Essential for understanding why the right strategy changes as the industry evolves.
The academic foundation of modularity theory applied to business. Baldwin and Clark demonstrate how modular architectures create "option value" — the ability to improve, replace, or recombine individual components without redesigning the entire system. The book's treatment of how the PC industry's modular architecture enabled parallel innovation across hundreds of independent firms is the most rigorous explanation of why modular systems evolve faster than integral ones. Provides the theoretical depth that Christensen's more accessible framework builds on.
Simon's foundational paper on hierarchical systems and near-decomposability — the insight that complex systems evolve most efficiently when organised into semi-independent modules. The paper predates the technology industry's modularity debates by decades but provides the theoretical framework that explains why modular architectures emerge naturally in complex systems: they are more evolvable, more robust to failure, and more adaptable to changing environments than integral alternatives. Short, dense, and permanently relevant.
Helmer's treatment of process power and cornered resources maps directly to the integral-layer advantage that modularity theory predicts. When a company's integration capability constitutes a process power — a deep operational competency that competitors cannot replicate — the company has built an integral position that is structurally defended. TSMC's fabrication process power, Apple's hardware-software integration, and NVIDIA's CUDA ecosystem are all examples where the integral layer's advantage is explained by Helmer's framework as durable strategic power.
Thompson's Aggregation Theory is the most important modern extension of modularity theory applied to internet-era businesses. Thompson argues that the internet modularised distribution — making content, products, and services available to everyone — and the companies that captured value were the aggregators that integrated the modular supply into a unified consumer experience: Google aggregated modular web content, Facebook aggregated modular social content, Amazon aggregated modular retail products. The framework extends Christensen's law to the platform economy and explains why aggregators are the most valuable companies in the world.
Modularity — When one layer commoditises, the adjacent layer captures the profits. The strategic question is always: are you in the modular layer or the integral layer?
Tension
Composability
Composability is modularity's promise — the ability to assemble complex systems from interchangeable, reusable components. The tension emerges in practice: highly composable systems are powerful in theory but fragile in execution. When every component is independently swappable, the integration burden shifts to the customer, who must ensure that the composed system works as a coherent whole. The "modern data stack" — a composable architecture of modular tools (Fivetran for ingestion, dbt for transformation, Snowflake for warehousing, Looker for visualisation) — is powerful for sophisticated teams and overwhelming for everyone else. The tension: modularity enables composability, but composability creates integration complexity that often drives customers back toward integrated solutions.
Leads-to
Abstraction
Modularisation drives abstraction — the creation of simplified interfaces that hide the complexity of the layer below. When a layer modularises, the integral layer above it typically abstracts the modular components into a unified interface. AWS abstracts the modular components of computing infrastructure (physical servers, networking equipment, storage arrays) into simple API calls. Stripe abstracts the modular components of payment processing (card networks, bank connections, fraud detection) into a single integration. Each abstraction makes the modular layer invisible to the customer, which reinforces the integral layer's value — because the customer interacts with the abstraction, not the components, and switching away from the abstraction means reassembling the components yourself.
Tension
Integration vs Outsourcing
Modularity's central strategic tension is the integration-vs-outsourcing decision. Modular architectures make outsourcing easy — if a component is standardised and interchangeable, buying it from a specialist is cheaper than building it in-house. But outsourcing a layer that later becomes integral means you've surrendered the value-capture position. IBM outsourced the OS (to Microsoft) and the processor (to Intel) because those layers seemed like modular components. They became the integral layers. The tension is dynamic: the decision to integrate or outsource must be evaluated not against today's architecture but against the architecture that Christensen's law predicts will emerge — and most managers, trained to optimise for current-state economics, make the decision on today's cost structure rather than tomorrow's value structure.
My operational rule: follow the margins. When you see an industry where one layer has expanding margins and the adjacent layer has compressing margins, you are watching Christensen's law in real time. The expanding-margin layer is integral. The compressing-margin layer is modular. Invest in the former. Avoid the latter. The law has not been wrong in any technology transition I have studied, and I see no structural reason it will fail in the transitions ahead.
