·Business & Strategy
Section 1
The Core Idea
Most companies do not have a bad strategy. They have five disconnected strategies. The product team has a vision. The sales team has a target market. The operations team has a cost structure. Marketing has a brand position. The executive team has a winning aspiration that sounds inspiring in the annual report. None of these choices were made in reference to the others. The result is an organisation pulling in five directions simultaneously — each direction defensible in isolation, none producing the compounding effect that comes from genuine strategic coherence. The Five Fits Framework, developed by Roger Martin and A.G. Lafley in their 2013 book Playing to Win, is a diagnostic and a discipline for making five strategic choices that reinforce each other as an integrated system rather than existing as separate ambitions that happen to share a corporate letterhead.
A.G. Lafley inherited the consequences of strategic incoherence when he became CEO of Procter & Gamble in June 2000. P&G was the world's largest consumer goods company, and it was drifting. Revenue growth had stalled. The stock had lost half its value in six months. Lafley's predecessor had been ousted after just seventeen months. The company was competing in dozens of categories — from food brands like Jif and Folgers to beauty brands like Olay to household brands like Tide — with no unifying logic for which categories deserved investment and which were distractions. P&G had a winning aspiration (be the world's leading consumer goods company), but the four choices beneath that aspiration — where to play, how to win, what capabilities to build, and what management systems to maintain — were incoherent. P&G was trying to win everywhere, with every strategy, which meant it was winning nowhere with sustained advantage.
Lafley, working with Martin — then dean of the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto — developed a framework that converted strategy from aspiration into a cascade of five mutually reinforcing choices. The five questions: (1) What is our winning aspiration? Not a mission statement. A definition of what winning actually looks like — measurable, specific, and honest about the ambition's scope. (2) Where will we play? Which markets, customer segments, channels, and geographies will we compete in — and equally important, which will we not? (3) How will we win? What is the specific competitive advantage that will make us the preferred choice in our chosen markets? (4) What capabilities must we have? What must we be world-class at to deliver the how-to-win? (5) What management systems do we need? What processes, metrics, structures, and incentive systems will sustain and reinforce the other four choices?
The framework's power is not in any single question — each question is obvious in isolation. The power is in the fit. Lafley restructured P&G around a coherent cascade: the winning aspiration was to be the undisputed leader in consumer goods categories where brand trust and household penetration drive repeat purchase. Where to play: beauty, baby care, fabric care, and home care — categories where P&G's R&D and brand-building capabilities created sustainable advantage. How to win: through deep consumer understanding and brand innovation that justified premium pricing. Capabilities needed: world-class consumer research, brand management, and global supply chain. Management systems: category management structure, innovation pipeline metrics, and a brand management rotation that developed general managers with deep category expertise. Each choice reinforced the others. P&G divested businesses that did not fit the cascade — Jif, Folgers, Pringles, and eventually its beauty brands that competed on fashion rather than trust. The divestitures were not failures. They were fit corrections. Under Lafley's first tenure, P&G's market capitalisation roughly doubled.