The Paradox of Boring
In the summer of 2023, a Swedish industrial conglomerate with a market capitalization exceeding 100 billion kronor — roughly $9.5 billion — held its annual general meeting in a modest venue in Enköping, a town of 23,000 people about an hour west of Stockholm. The CEO's presentation lasted thirty-seven minutes. There were no slides about artificial intelligence, no references to platform ecosystems, no invocations of paradigm shifts. The company's strategy was summarized in a handful of sentences: buy good businesses, keep their managers, don't interfere, repeat. Then the shareholders voted, ate their canapés, and went home.
The company was Lifco. And the brevity of that presentation concealed one of the most extraordinary compounding machines in European public markets — a serial acquirer that has delivered total shareholder returns exceeding 3,800% since its 2014 IPO, turning a somewhat obscure dental supplies distributor into a diversified industrial group operating more than 200 subsidiaries across 33 countries, generating revenues north of SEK 22 billion and operating margins that would make most industrial conglomerates weep.
The paradox is this: Lifco does nothing exciting. It buys niche industrial businesses — demolition tools, dental equipment, environmental technology, interiors for offshore vessels — that rarely make headlines. It avoids transformational mergers. It refuses to centralize. It runs with a corporate staff so lean that the entire head office in Enköping houses fewer than 20 people. And yet, this deliberately boring approach has produced returns that dwarf those of most technology companies, most private equity funds, and virtually every other Nordic industrial group over the same period. The question that animates this profile is whether Lifco's radical decentralization and disciplined acquisition model represent a durable competitive advantage — a structural edge rooted in organizational design — or whether the strategy contains the seeds of its own deceleration, a flywheel that spins beautifully until it doesn't.
By the Numbers
Lifco at a Glance
SEK 22.6BRevenue (FY2023)
~22%EBITA margin (FY2023)
200+Operating subsidiaries
33Countries of operation
~9,000Employees
SEK 110B+Market capitalization (mid-2024)
~3,800%Total return since 2014 IPO
~15Acquisitions per year (recent pace)
The Wallenberg Shadow and the Dental Supply Closet
To understand Lifco, you have to understand the peculiar ecosystem from which it emerged — the Swedish serial acquirer tradition — and the specific man who bent that tradition into something sharper.
Sweden, for reasons that have filled several academic papers and at least one excellent book by Per Lindvall, produces an outsized number of decentralized industrial conglomerates. The template traces back to the Wallenberg family and their holding company Investor AB, but the modern iteration owes more to a cluster of companies that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s: Danaher (American, but influential), Addtech, Lagercrantz, Indutrade, and above all, the ur-model, Berkshire Hathaway. The Swedish ecosystem added its own flavor — an obsession with organic cash flow, a cultural comfort with flat hierarchies, and a tax environment that, for much of the 20th century, favored reinvestment over distribution.
Lifco's origin is unglamorous. The company was founded in 1998 as a holding vehicle for Carl Bennet, a Swedish industrialist whose fortune derived from medical technology and who had accumulated a portfolio of businesses including a dominant Nordic dental supplies distributor. Bennet — a Gothenburg native, quiet and methodical, with an investor's temperament wrapped in an engineer's sensibility — had been chairman of Getinge, the medical technology group, and understood that the real money in fragmented industrial markets lay not in building from scratch but in consolidating positions where you could buy earnings at reasonable multiples and let them compound without interference.
For years, Lifco was private and sleepy. The dental division — primarily a business called Dental Depot — distributed consumables and equipment to dental practices across Scandinavia, Germany, and eventually broader Europe. It was a steady, high-margin business with recurring revenue characteristics: dentists needed supplies constantly, switching costs were moderate but real (integrated ordering systems, established relationships with sales reps), and the market was fragmented enough that a well-capitalized consolidator could roll up distributors at 6–8x EBIT.
The IPO, when it came in November 2014, was almost reluctant. Lifco listed on Nasdaq Stockholm at a valuation of roughly SEK 13 billion. The prospectus revealed three divisions: Dental, Demolition & Tools, and Systems Solutions. Analysts noted the high margins but struggled to categorize the company. Was it a dental play? An industrial holding company? A mini-Berkshire? The market shrugged. Then the returns began.
Per Waldemarson and the Art of Not Managing
The engine of Lifco's performance since the IPO has been its CEO, Per Waldemarson, who joined the company in 2019 after a career at Danaher — the American serial acquirer that practically invented the modern industrial platform playbook. Waldemarson brought Danaher's rigor to Lifco's Swedish decentralization, and the synthesis proved potent.
Waldemarson is not a showman. He speaks in clipped, precise sentences about return on capital, acquisition multiples, and margin expansion. He does not give keynote speeches at conferences. He does not tweet. His management philosophy can be summarized in a sentence he has repeated in various forms: the best thing head office can do for a subsidiary is leave it alone, as long as it is performing. This is not absenteeism — Lifco tracks a small number of financial KPIs for each subsidiary with genuine intensity — but it is a radical rejection of the matrix-management, synergy-extracting model that dominates most industrial conglomerates.
We believe that the best decisions are made closest to the customer. Our role at the group level is to allocate capital, set financial targets, and get out of the way.
The organizational architecture is worth describing precisely, because it is the strategy. Lifco's 200+ subsidiaries operate as autonomous units. Each has its own CEO, its own P&L, its own customer relationships. There is no shared procurement function. There is no group-wide ERP system. There are no mandatory "synergy workshops" or integration playbooks. When Lifco acquires a company, the management team typically stays, the brand typically stays, the customers rarely know that anything has changed. The only things that change are the financial targets — which become somewhat more ambitious — and the access to capital, which becomes dramatically better.
This sounds like a platitude. Everyone claims to be decentralized. The difference is that Lifco actually means it, and the proof is in the numbers: the head office in Enköping has fewer than 20 people. For a group generating SEK 22 billion in revenue across 33 countries. That ratio — roughly one corporate employee per SEK 1 billion in revenue — is extraordinarily lean even by the standards of other Nordic serial acquirers.
The Three Pillars, or How to Make Dentistry and Demolition Rhyme
Lifco's portfolio is organized into three divisions that, at first glance, share nothing except their owner. But the logic binding them is not operational synergy — it is financial profile.
Dental remains the historical core. This division distributes dental consumables, equipment, and software to dental practices across Europe, with particularly strong positions in Germany, Scandinavia, and Italy. The business is characterized by high recurring revenue (consumables represent the bulk of sales), moderate but sticky customer relationships, and stable margins. Dental accounted for roughly 40% of group revenue in 2023, though its share has been declining as the other divisions grow faster through acquisition.
Demolition & Tools is the segment that most confuses analysts. Lifco owns Brokk, the global market leader in remote-controlled demolition machines — a genuinely dominant niche player with something like 50% global market share in a product category it essentially created. Brokk machines are used in nuclear decommissioning, tunneling, cement production, and mining — environments where a human operator would be in danger. The division also includes other specialized tool and equipment companies. This segment contributes roughly 25% of revenue and carries the highest margins in the group.
Systems Solutions is the catch-all — a portfolio of businesses providing environmental technology, contract manufacturing, interiors for offshore and marine vessels, saw-mill equipment, and various other industrial niche products. It is the fastest-growing division, primarily through acquisition, and represents about 35% of revenue.
The connecting tissue is not the product but the market structure. Every Lifco subsidiary operates in a market that is:
- Niche — small enough that large conglomerates ignore it, fragmented enough that a focused player can build a leading position
- Characterized by high customer switching costs — whether through regulatory requirements (dental), mission-critical applications (demolition), or specification-driven purchasing (systems solutions)
- Generating robust free cash flow — typically asset-light or at least capital-efficient, with high returns on invested capital
The portfolio construction is, in essence, a bet on the persistence of niche market leadership. Lifco doesn't need its businesses to cross-sell or share technology. It needs them to keep being good at their particular thing, throw off cash, and allow that cash to be redeployed into acquiring the next niche leader.
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Brokk: The Hidden Champion
Lifco's most distinctive subsidiary
Brokk AB, headquartered in Skellefteå in northern Sweden, manufactures remote-controlled demolition machines. Founded in 1976, Brokk created the product category and has maintained roughly 50% global market share for decades. The machines — ranging from 1-ton models for tight indoor work to 12-ton units for heavy demolition — are sold globally, with particularly strong demand in nuclear decommissioning (where remote operation is not a convenience but a necessity), tunneling, and cement kiln maintenance. Brokk's competitive advantages include deep engineering expertise, a global service network, and the simple fact that specifying engineers at major construction and industrial firms have spent careers working with Brokk equipment. The business runs at EBITA margins estimated north of 25%. It is, in miniature, the Lifco model made tangible: a niche market leader with high switching costs and pricing power, acquired and left alone.
The Acquisition Machine
Lifco's acquisition model is its defining capability — the thing it does better than almost anything else, repeated with metronomic consistency.
The numbers tell the story. Since the IPO in 2014, Lifco has completed more than 80 acquisitions. The pace has accelerated: in 2023 alone, the company closed approximately 15 deals. The typical target is a privately held, founder-led business with revenues between SEK 50 million and SEK 500 million, operating in a niche industrial market, generating EBITA margins of 15% or higher, with a track record of steady (not explosive) growth. The typical acquisition multiple is 7–9x EBIT, though Lifco is disciplined enough to walk away from deals that price above this range — a restraint that distinguishes it from late-cycle private equity buyers.
The sourcing model is distinctive. Lifco does not rely heavily on investment banks or auction processes. Instead, it cultivates direct relationships with business owners, often over years. The pitch to a founder is simple: sell to us, and your business continues as before. Your name stays on the door. Your team stays. You might stay, if you want to. We will provide capital for growth investments and acquisitions within your niche. We will not merge you with a competitor, rebrand you, or layer you with consultants. The only change is that your financial targets will get more demanding, and you'll be part of a group with a balance sheet that enables you to think bigger.
This pitch resonates in Nordic markets, where family-owned businesses are culturally important and founders often prefer continuity to the highest possible price. Lifco consistently wins deals against private equity firms bidding higher multiples, because the founder values the promise of operational independence.
We have never done a hostile takeover. We buy companies where the seller wants to sell to us. That is an important distinction.
The integration model — or rather, the deliberate absence of integration — is equally important. When Lifco acquires a company, the process is startlingly light. There is no 100-day plan. There are no integration teams. There are no synergy targets. The acquired company is assigned to one of the three divisions, begins reporting its financials to the group, and... continues. The metrics that Lifco tracks are primarily financial: organic revenue growth, EBITA margin, return on operating capital, cash conversion. If those numbers are healthy, head office does not intervene. If they deteriorate, the conversation intensifies — but even then, the first instinct is to work with the existing management team rather than replace it.
This model creates a powerful selection effect. Businesses that self-select into Lifco's orbit tend to be well-run, because poorly run businesses don't generate the margins Lifco requires. And the managers who choose to sell to Lifco rather than to a private equity fund tend to be operators who genuinely care about their business's long-term health — precisely the people you want running an autonomous subsidiary.
The Carl Bennet Question
No discussion of Lifco is complete without reckoning with its controlling shareholder. Carl Bennet, through his investment company Carl Bennet AB, holds roughly 50% of the voting power in Lifco (via dual-class share structures common in Swedish corporate governance). He is the chairman and the company's architect.
Bennet, born in 1951, made his initial fortune in medical technology — he was the controlling shareholder of Getinge, the surgical equipment and infection control company, for decades. He is, by Swedish standards, enormously wealthy. He is also, by any standard, patient. His investment horizon is measured in decades, not quarters, and his willingness to let Lifco compound without extracting value through excessive dividends or share buybacks has been a crucial enabler of the acquisition machine.
The concentrated ownership cuts both ways. On the positive side, it provides strategic stability. Bennet has never pushed for a transformational merger, never demanded that Lifco "do something big" to satisfy activist shareholders, never wavered from the acquisition model when the market wobbled. His presence insulates management from the short-term pressures that corrode decision-making at widely held companies.
The risk is equally obvious: key-man dependency. Bennet is 73. Succession — both at the chairman level and, eventually, in the ownership structure — is the single most-discussed risk factor among Lifco investors. Bennet has been characteristically opaque about his plans. His children are involved in the family's business interests but have not taken public roles at Lifco. The question of whether Lifco's culture survives its founder's eventual withdrawal is not hypothetical. It is the question.
Compounding in Kronor
The financial record demands examination, because it is the evidence that the model works — and the evidence contains clues about where it might not.
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Lifco's Financial Trajectory
Key metrics from IPO to present
2014IPO on Nasdaq Stockholm. Revenue: SEK 8.2B. EBITA margin: ~17%. Market cap: ~SEK 13B.
2016Revenue crosses SEK 10B. Acquisition pace accelerates to 8–10 deals per year. EBITA margin expands to ~18%.
2018Revenue reaches SEK 13.5B. Dental division remains largest segment. First significant Systems Solutions acquisitions diversify the portfolio.
2020COVID-19 impact is modest — dental segment sees temporary decline, but demolition and systems solutions prove resilient. Revenue: SEK 14.3B.
2021Revenue jumps to SEK 17.1B on post-pandemic recovery and aggressive acquisition. EBITA margin climbs past 20%.
2023Revenue: SEK 22.6B. EBITA margin: ~22%. More than 200 subsidiaries. Market cap exceeds SEK 100B. Total return since IPO: ~3,800%.
Several features of this trajectory are worth isolating.
First, the margin expansion. Lifco's EBITA margin has expanded from roughly 17% at the time of the IPO to approximately 22% in 2023 — a 500-basis-point improvement that represents a compounding of profitability on a growing revenue base. This is not achieved through cost-cutting at the corporate level (there is barely any corporate cost to cut). It is achieved through two mechanisms: acquiring businesses with higher margins than the group average (positive mix shift), and gently pushing existing subsidiaries to improve their own margins through pricing discipline and operational focus.
Second, the organic growth. This is the metric that separates great serial acquirers from mere roll-ups. Lifco has consistently delivered organic revenue growth in the mid-single digits — roughly 5–7% in most years, though the figure varies by division and cycle. This matters because it means the acquired businesses are growing, not stagnating. The acquisition machine is not masking underlying decay.
Third, the cash conversion. Lifco converts roughly 95% or more of its EBITA into operating cash flow in a typical year. This is the fuel that feeds the acquisition engine without requiring equity issuance or excessive leverage. Lifco has maintained a conservative balance sheet — net debt to EBITDA typically in the range of 1.5–2.5x — that provides the firepower for acquisitions while preserving flexibility for downturns.
Fourth — and this is what the market is really paying for — the return on capital. Lifco's return on operating capital has consistently exceeded 20%, a figure that, combined with the ability to reinvest at similar returns through acquisitions, creates the mathematical conditions for extraordinary compounding. This is the Buffett insight applied to industrial microcaps: the value of a business is not its current earnings but its ability to reinvest retained earnings at high rates. Lifco's acquisition pipeline is, in effect, a reinvestment opportunity with a predictable return profile.
The Swedish Serial Acquirer Ecosystem
Lifco does not exist in isolation. It is part of a broader Swedish ecosystem of serial acquirers — companies like Addtech, Lagercrantz, Indutrade, Sdiptech, and Storskogen — that have collectively reshaped Nordic capital markets over the past two decades. Understanding this ecosystem illuminates both Lifco's advantages and the competitive pressures it faces.
The ecosystem's density is remarkable. Sweden, a country of 10 million people, has produced more listed serial acquirers per capita than any other market in the world. The reasons are partly cultural (Swedish business culture valorizes consensus, flat hierarchies, and long-term thinking), partly structural (the dual-class share structure enables founder-controlled companies to pursue patient strategies), and partly imitative (success breeds imitation, and the success of early movers like Indutrade and Addtech inspired dozens of followers).
The problem — for Lifco and for the model generally — is that this very density has created competition for acquisitions. A decade ago, a well-positioned Swedish serial acquirer bidding on a family-owned industrial niche business might face competition from a local private equity fund and perhaps one other strategic buyer. Today, the same target might attract interest from five or six listed serial acquirers, several private equity firms, and increasingly, international industrial groups that have adopted the Nordic playbook. The effect on multiples has been predictable: acquisition prices have drifted upward, from 5–7x EBIT a decade ago to 7–10x EBIT today, with premium assets occasionally commanding 12x or more.
Lifco's response has been twofold. First, it has expanded its geographic scope — acquiring businesses in continental Europe, the UK, and North America where the competitive dynamics are different and the Swedish acquirer model is less familiar. Second, it has leaned harder into its cultural pitch to founders, emphasizing the permanence of its ownership model versus the inevitable exit horizon of private equity. Both strategies are working, for now. But the arithmetic of serial acquisition is unforgiving: as the base grows larger, each marginal acquisition contributes less to group growth, and the pressure to either pay higher multiples or acquire larger (and riskier) targets intensifies.
The Dental Anchor
Dental deserves a closer look, because it reveals the tensions within Lifco's model.
The dental distribution market in Europe is structurally attractive: fragmented supply chains, high recurring revenue, moderate but real switching costs, and a customer base (dentists) that is both growing in number and spending more per practice as technology advances. Lifco's dental businesses — operating under multiple brands in Germany, Scandinavia, Italy, and elsewhere — have historically been the group's most stable profit generators.
But the segment faces headwinds. The rise of digital dentistry (CAD/CAM systems, intraoral scanners, 3D printing) is shifting value within the supply chain, potentially disintermediating traditional distributors as manufacturers sell directly. Henry Schein and Patterson Companies, the dominant dental distributors in the U.S., have both experienced margin pressure from this shift. European markets lag the U.S. in digital adoption, which gives Lifco a buffer — but the trajectory is clear.
Lifco's response has been to invest in digital capabilities within its dental businesses and to diversify the group's revenue mix toward non-dental segments. The declining share of dental revenue — from roughly 50% of the group at IPO to approximately 40% in 2023 — is partly deliberate portfolio construction and partly a reflection of faster acquisition activity in the other divisions.
The dental division is also where the organic-versus-acquired growth question is most acute. Organic growth in European dental distribution has been modest — low single digits in most years, occasionally flat. The acquisitions within the dental segment have been primarily geographic (entering new country markets) rather than transformative. If digital disruption accelerates, this division could shift from being the stable cash cow that funds the acquisition machine to being a drag on group-level margins and growth.
What Danaher Taught and What It Didn't
The Danaher influence on Lifco — primarily through Waldemarson's career there — is worth examining carefully, because the differences are as instructive as the similarities.
Danaher, the Washington, D.C.–based conglomerate, pioneered the modern version of acquisition-led industrial compounding. Its Danaher Business System (DBS) — a rigorous set of operating tools derived from lean manufacturing — is applied to every acquired business, often transforming margins within 18–24 months. The DBS is the Danaher secret: it provides a repeatable mechanism for operational improvement that justifies paying higher multiples, because the acquirer can reliably extract value that the previous owner could not.
Lifco has no equivalent system. There is no "Lifco Business System." There are no mandatory operational improvement programs. There is no cadre of lean manufacturing consultants who parachute into acquired businesses. This is a conscious choice, not an omission. Lifco's view is that the DBS model works at Danaher's scale and within Danaher's verticals (life sciences, diagnostics) but would be corrosive to the entrepreneurial culture that makes Lifco's acquired businesses attractive in the first place. A family-owned Swedish demolition tool company does not want to be subjected to a 200-page operational improvement playbook. It wants to be left alone to do what it does well, with better access to capital.
The tradeoff is real. Danaher's model creates value post-acquisition through operational improvement, which means it can afford to pay higher multiples and still generate attractive returns. Lifco's model creates value primarily through capital allocation — buying at the right price and letting the business compound — which means it is more sensitive to acquisition multiples and more dependent on the quality of the businesses it buys. When multiples are low and target quality is high, Lifco's approach is arguably superior (lower integration risk, happier management teams, less disruption to customer relationships). When multiples are high and operational improvement is required to justify the price, the Danaher model has an edge.
They asked me three questions: can you grow, can you improve your margins, and can you generate cash. I said yes to all three. They said welcome to Lifco. That was the integration.
The Invisible Headquarters
The Enköping head office is not merely a cost-saving measure. It is a philosophical statement encoded in real estate.
Twenty people. For 200+ subsidiaries. For 9,000 employees. The math implies a radical conception of what a corporate center should do. At Lifco, the answer is: allocate capital, set financial targets, monitor performance, and conduct acquisitions. That's it. There is no group marketing function. No group HR function. No group procurement function. No group IT function. Each subsidiary handles these for itself.
The benefits are tangible and significant. First, speed. Without layers of corporate approval, subsidiary CEOs can make decisions — hiring, pricing, capital expenditure — at the speed their markets require. Second, accountability. When there is no corporate overhead to blame, subsidiary performance is unambiguously the responsibility of subsidiary management. Third, cost. Lifco's corporate overhead is negligible as a percentage of revenue — a few tens of millions of kronor against more than 22 billion in sales.
The risks are less visible but no less real. Information asymmetry is the obvious one: with twenty people monitoring 200+ businesses, there is an inherent limit to how deeply head office can understand any individual subsidiary's market dynamics, competitive threats, or management issues. Lifco mitigates this through frequent financial reporting and periodic site visits, but the system depends on subsidiary management being both competent and honest. When it works — which is most of the time — it works beautifully. When a subsidiary conceals a deteriorating competitive position or a management problem, the decentralized structure can allow issues to fester longer than they would in a more hands-on organization.
The other risk is cultural. Lifco's model requires a specific type of subsidiary CEO: autonomous, financially disciplined, comfortable operating without support infrastructure. Not every acquired management team fits this profile. And as Lifco acquires more businesses — particularly outside the Nordics, where management cultures differ — the challenge of maintaining the model's integrity grows.
The Multiple Question
Lifco trades at a premium. Always has. As of mid-2024, the stock commands an enterprise value of roughly 30–35x trailing EBIT — a multiple that would make a value investor reach for antacids. The premium reflects the market's belief in the durability of the compounding machine, but it also creates a mathematical reality that constrains the company's options.
At 30x+ EBIT, Lifco's stock is priced for near-perfection. The implied return depends entirely on continued execution: sustained organic growth, continued margin expansion, a steady stream of value-accretive acquisitions at disciplined multiples. Any stumble — a year of missed acquisition targets, a margin compression in the dental division, a rising interest rate environment that crimps acquisition multiples — and the stock's multiple compresses disproportionately.
This is the serial acquirer's valuation paradox. The strategy works best when acquisition multiples are low and the acquirer's own stock multiple is high (enabling accretive acquisitions whether done for cash or equity). But the very success of the strategy inflates the acquirer's stock multiple, creating pressure to sustain growth — which, at some point, requires either paying more per acquisition, acquiring larger (and riskier) targets, or accepting deceleration. Every serial acquirer in history has eventually confronted this trilemma. Lifco has not yet been forced to choose.
The bears argue that this moment is approaching. With acquisition multiples rising across the Nordic serial acquirer ecosystem, with Lifco's own revenue base now exceeding SEK 22 billion (meaning that a SEK 200 million acquisition — large by historical standards — adds less than 1% to revenue), and with the global interest rate environment having shifted structurally higher since 2022, the mathematical conditions for continued hyper-compounding are deteriorating.
The bulls counter that Lifco's organic growth, margin expansion, and geographic expansion into less competitive acquisition markets provide runway for years. They point to Danaher, which sustained its compounding for three decades before reaching a size where deceleration was inevitable — and even then, continued to deliver double-digit returns. Lifco, at roughly $10 billion in market cap, is still a fraction of Danaher's scale and has vast fragmented markets left to consolidate.
Both arguments have merit. The resolution will be determined not by theory but by execution — specifically, by whether Lifco can maintain acquisition discipline as it scales. That discipline, more than any other factor, is what separates serial acquirers that compound for decades from those that implode.
A Machine That Runs Quiet
In April 2024, Lifco reported first-quarter results that perfectly encapsulated the model. Revenue grew 9% — roughly half organic, half acquired. EBITA margin expanded by 70 basis points. Cash conversion exceeded 100% of EBITA. Five acquisitions were completed during the quarter. The stock barely moved. It had all happened before, and the market expected it to happen again.
There is something almost uncanny about a company that produces the same type of quarter, year after year, in an economy subject to recessions, pandemics, supply chain disruptions, and geopolitical shocks. The explanation is structural: Lifco's extreme diversification — 200+ subsidiaries across dozens of end markets — provides a statistical averaging effect that smooths volatility. When one subsidiary struggles, others compensate. When one market cycles down, another cycles up. The portfolio is, in effect, a manually constructed index fund of European niche industrial leaders, held together not by a unifying technology or customer base but by a shared financial discipline and a common owner who allocates capital with unusual skill.
The machine runs quiet. It does not announce strategic pivots or reorganizations. It does not hold analyst days with ten-year vision statements. It issues its quarterly reports, completes its acquisitions, compounds its capital, and lets the results accumulate. In Enköping, in a building you could walk past without noticing, fewer than twenty people manage a $10 billion enterprise that has made its shareholders very, very wealthy.
On the wall of Per Waldemarson's office, according to one report, there is a single framed quote. It reads:
"The big money is not in the buying or the selling, but in the waiting." The attribution is to
Charlie Munger. The sentiment could be Lifco's epitaph — or, if the compounding continues, its inheritance.
